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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STArrE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

I

- vs.-

Case No.

10175

L 1~: \VIS ~LftiE·R FRAYER, alias
\VILLIAM CLIFFORD LYNN
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIE.F OF APPELLANT

DEPOSITION IN LOWE.R .COURT
The appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of
in 2nd Degree, from which conviction the appellant appeals.
~[urder

STAT·E~IENT

OF NATURE OF T'HE CASE

This is a crinrinal appeal brought by the AppeHant
from a Yerdict of guilty rendered by a jury to the charge
of :Jf urder in the Secon\d Degree.
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2
The facts offered at trial were that in the early
morning hours of July 7, 1963, Louis Sylva Garcia, an
itinerant musician, was fatally shot through the head
by a firearm presumably of 22 calibre. (Tr. 130-134) The
shooting apparently occurred while the deceased was
sleeping in a seated position behind the steering wheel
of a 1958 Oldsmobile parked along the roadside of Highway 91, West of Centerville, Utah, just South of Parrish
Lane. Charles Roger "Rocky" Bierschwal, age 18, also
an itine~ant musician and Mrs. Barbara Haarman, divorcee, were present at the time of the shooting, but both
claimed to be sleeping in the front seat of the auto, when
the shot was fired wilthout knowledge of when the fatal
shot was fired. (T'r. 28, 46, 47)
Rocky testified that when he first awoke he observed
the defendant with a pistol in his hand "in the process"
of entering the automobile through the front door on the
right-hand side of the automobile, where he was seated.
When challenged, the Defendant assured Rocky he didn't
want to hurt anyone, that he was only looking for a place
to sleep, and that the gun was harmless. (Tr. 47, 48)
Rocky got into the hack seat to prepare a place for
defendant to rest burt became enraged when he thought
defendant was making advances toward the· sleeping Mrs.
Haarman. He pulled defendant from the front seat of the
automobile and

be~an

striking him about the head and

shoulders with a stick. (Tr. 29-30, 48-49) Defendant be-
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p;an erying mHl asked for his gun back. Rocky checked
tlw pbtol, found it t'mpty, and returned it to defendant.
lt wa~ then agrPPd that defendant should be given a ride
into ~alt Lake City. ('Tr. 29-31, 48-52)
\YIH'n Rocky :and l\1rs. Haarman attempted to awaken
dt't'Pa~Pd

tlwy found him to be unconscious and di'ScoverPd traeP~ of blood. (':Cr. 31, 52) They slid deceased from
thP driver's seat into the middle of the front seat and
1\oeky drove to Saint Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City.
Tho dd't>ndant rode in the back seat and upon arriVJal at
the hospital disappeared. (T'r. 31-34, 52-54)
On July 10, 19·65 at 12 :45 A.M. the defendant was
picked up in a Balt Lake City tavern by Davis County
~hl'riff deputies and taken before a police lineup at the
~al t Lake City Police Station ( T'r. 190, 191). About an
hour later he was transported to Farmington, D~avis
County for two additional lineups. (T·r. 191) Defendant
was then formally notified that he was under arrest,
<'harged with First D·egre·e Murder, and booked in the
Davis County Jail. (Tr. 201, 202, 205)
Three different and conflicting statements were
taken fr01n the accused between the hours of 3 :00 A.M. to
3:30 P.~I. on July 10, 1963. (T'r. 245-255) In the third
statement defendant stated he accidently discharged the
pistol ,,·hile attempting to open the glove compartment
of tlw parked vehicle while searching for dope (T'r. 147,
1~8)
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This appeal raises for review by this Court, three
questions of Law.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT',S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WHEN 'THE DISTRICT
ATORNEY CROSS EXAMINED DEFENDANT ON HIS
PRIOR JUVENILE RECORD, AND COMPOUNDED ERROR
BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER SUCH EVIDENCE TO REFUTE AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GOOD CHARACTER.
POINT II
THE 'TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY ADMI'T'TING INTO EVIDENCE, OVER COUNSEL'S OBJECTIONS, EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED INVOLUNTARILY GIVEN, DURING A PERIOD OF
ILLEGAL ARREST AND DE'T'EN'TION, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES INHERANTLY COERCIVE AND IN VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTTTUT'IONS.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY GIVING THE JURY AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND
DEGREE MURDER WHEN THE PROSECUTION PROCEEDED UNDER THE FELONY MURDER THEORY AND THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT A
CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER.
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ARGP~fENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WHEN THE DISTRICT
ATORNEY CROSS

EXAMINED

DEFENDANT

ON

HIS

PRIOR JUVENILE RECORD, AND COMPOUNDED ERROR
BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER SUCH EVIDENCE TO REFUTE AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GOOD CHARACT'ER.

The prosecution
follow~. ( Tr. 572)

cross-e~amined

the Defendant as

"Q.

You have testified on direct-examinakion as
to your reputation for working, and not having been before the authorities, no trouble
or problems; is that right~

A.

No, Sir. Mr. Hansen asked me if I was ever
in prison.

Q. Let me ask you this: Have you been before
the juvenile authorities for things that would
be tantamount to felonies, if you weren't a
juvenile-be the same as felonies~
A.

Yes. Sir.
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Q. And how many times have you been before
the Juvenile Court fo·r serious offenses that
would be the same as felonies if you had been
an adult~
A.

About rthree, four, something like that.

Q. Did one involve burglary, and setting
A.

fires~

Yes, sir.

Q. Another involve unlawful entry and damage
to property~
A.

I believe so.

Q. Another one involve theft of some money
from a church in Murray~
A.

Yes, sir."

Whereupon counsel for defense asked for a mistrial
Tr. 575) The court denied appellant's motion stating
that the defense opened the questtion on direct examination and the defense failed to object to the questions
(Tr. 580) 'The court failed to admonish the jury to disregard completely such statemell!ts and in Jury Instruction
No. 32 advised the jury that such evidence was admissable "for the purpose of refuting affirn1ative e·vidence
by defendant of his good character." ('Tr. 606) The trial
court's ruling is without foundation in fact and without
merit in }taw.
{

1
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Defen~P introduced no evidence which could be construed as putting the defendant's character in issue.
On di n•et exmnination no reference was made to his
jnvPnil8 rpeord. lie testified as to his age, education,
hroken homelife, placPs he had lived, who he had lived

with, f'onnPr Pmployment, and as to his intentions and
aetion~

leading up to and subsequent to his arrest for

tlu• in<'ident for which he was on trial. (Tr. 512-534)

'

:

\Yhen asked by his counsel, '·'Have you ever been
convicted of a felony, Louie, by imprisonment in a state
prison, hen•,

~California

or

anyplace~",

he replied "No."

('rr. 51G) His stating he had no prior convictions of :a
1\•lony was proper, truthful and not :misleading. By statut(-) juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature,

t'.C.A. 55-10-26 (19'53), and adjudications are not to be
drrmed convictions.
T·rial court's instructions to the jury authorizing
them to consider such evidence to refute evidence of good
character is without precedence and flys in the face of a
statutory prohibition.

r tah

law prohibits admissions of such evidence

against the party involved in any case or proceeding
in any court.

Utah Code Annotated 55-10-33 ( 1953

amended) provides :
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"Judgment not criminal in nature-Inadmissible in Evidence. - No 1adjudication upon the
status of any child by the juvenile court, shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by a conviction in a criminal case, nor
shall any child be deemed a crimnal by reason of
such adjudiCJation, nor shall such adjudication
be deemed a conviction. Neither the record of the
disposition of a child nor any evidence given in
Juvenile court shall be admissible as evidence
against the child in any CJase or proceedings in any
other court."
Under statutes such as this there appears to he no
disagreement that the prohibition against the use of any
evidence of juvenile court matters in any other courts
has received liberal construction. Such is inadmissiblB
for any purpose against one who was a juvenlie offender
and testifies in another proceeding. 147 ALR. 446.
In Malone v. State (1936), 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 NE
473 the Ohio Supreme Court reversed a lower court con-

viction of First Degree :Murder where prosecution was
allowed to cross-examine defendant as to matters which
had been rthe subject of proceedings in the juvenile court
and observed that to permit the use of such evidence "to
discredit him or mark him as one possessing a criminal
history" would be contrary to both the letter and spirit
of the legislaJtive enactment.
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Again in /;OH'e v. State, 63 So. 2d 285 a conviction of
:2nd I )pgTPP Hnrglary was reversed due to trial courts permitting solieitor to cross-examine defendant as to a prior
S(•nkn<'P to n reform school for breaking into places. See
also Stole v. f{elley (19·30) 169' La. T53 126 49; Thomas
-v. U·w~ted Sta.tes (1941) 74 App. D.C. 167, 121 F. 2d 905;
State l'. Co.r (192+, :Mo.) 263 SW 215; State v. Morinski
(1 !H~) 139 Ohio St. 559; 41 NE 2d 287; Berge v. St,ate
( 19~:3) 96 rrex. Crim. Rep. 32, 255 S.W. 754; Robison v.
State (1928) 110 'Tex Crim Rep. 345, 7 S.W. 2d 571;
Smith v. St.ate (1929') 113 Tex. Crim. Rep. 124; 18 S.W.
:2(1 1070 for general holdings that witnesses may not be
e ross-Pxmnined as to prior juvenile records under stattltl's silnliar to Utah.

In Schafer v. State, 51 S.W. 2d 356 the district attorIWY cross-examined the accused in a murder case regarding a prior sentence to a reformatory and upon objection by defense, stated he expected to show conviction
and sentence to the reformatory. The trial judge promptly instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question and statement. 'The appellate court declared the
prosecutors statements in1proper and prejudicial if they
"could have affected the fairness of the trial." It was
held the circumstances of that case did not justify reversal because (1) the trial court promptly instructed
the jury to totally disregard such statements and ( 2)
the jury has already in possession of facts as to other
offenses not in the nature of juvenile proceedings which
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showed the accused had been indicted for shooting at
deceased before the alleged homicide and also had information as to indictments for other felonies and convictions of misdemeanors the gravity of which 1nade a
minor reference to a sentence to a reformatory inconsequential.
The trial court's added assertion that the defendant
failed to timely object is also without me-rit, and in no
way corrects court's error in instruction. The prosecution is a quasi-judicial office and it is his duty to see
that defendant gets a fair trial. He is not at liberty
to raise questions for the purpose of forcing defendant
to object. The damage· is completed when the objection
is made as implied in the Schafer case, supra.
1

For waiver see Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158,
150 A. 2d 863 (1959). ·The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
where the issue wa.s not ever raised until oral argument
on appeal, reversed a First Degree Murde-r conviction
where prosecutor during cross-examination n1ade repeated refe·rences to defendant's criminal record which
could not he justified as an attack on defendant's credibility declaring such to prejudice a fair trial.
In the cruse at bar the cross examination of the district attorney was improper and unlawful by statute.
The trial judge 1nade no attempt to cleanse the record
but in fact advised the jury to consider such evidence.
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The c.ross-t~xainination was clearly prejudicial to a fair
trial for defendant with references to burglary, unlawful
l'ntry, setting fires, destruction of property and theft
of property. The defendant did not and could not open
up the subject to inquiry; nor did he or could he waive
his statutory protection against impeachment by such
evidence; nor did he nor could he waive his right to a
fair trial. A trial interrupted and delayed by the tragic
assassination of President Kennedy.
POINT II
THE 'TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
JECTIONS, EXTRAJUDI,CIAL ST ATEMENT.S OF THE A!CCUSED INVOLUNTARILY GIVEN, DURING A PERIOD OF
ILLEGAL ARREST AND DET'ENTION, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES INHERANTLY .COERJCIVE AND IN VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.

Defendant at the time of his arrest was an 18 year old
hoy having completed the 9th grade in school. He is the
product of a broken home plagued with frequent shifts in
residenees between parents. Substantial evidence introduced during the trial indicates he was prone to excessive
consumption of alcohol and had been drinking just prior
to his arrest, detention, and interrogation. ('Tr. 249) The
record is filled with instances showing his emotional
instability and susceptability to suggestion.
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Sheriff Hammon admitted the written and oral statPments were taken after defendant requested counsel and
attempted to obtain such. The statements \Yere taken
prior to any contact with anyone outside the Sheriff's department. ( T'r. 229, 408, 409)
1

'The arrest and detention of Defendant were illegal
and prejudicial. He was t:aken into custody without a
warrant, by Davis County Sheriff's officers while at a
bar in Salt Lake City, S alt Lake County, and transported
to the Salt Lake City Police Station for identification.
He ~as not taken before a magistrate, advised of charges
ag-liinst him or provided legal counsel. Within an hour he
was transported to the Davis County Jail in F'armington,
· Utah, without a warrant of arrest, or other legal hearing
or process
1

Utah Code Annotated 77-13-17 (195-3) clearly prohibits such action declaring, "when an arrest is made
without warrant by ~a peace officer or private person,
the person arrested must without unreasonable delay be
taken to the nearest or most accessible magist.rate in
the county in which the arrest is made, and a complaint
stating the eharge against the person must he n1ade before such magistrate."
Defendant was taken out of Salt Lake County without an opportunity to contact friends or relatives and
booked in the Davis County Jail in Farmington, Utah
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whore hP knew no one and had no one to advise him. Even
though allowed to use the telephone defendant was effc·etivPly deprivPd of any outside counsel. He had no
funds to retain counsel and apparently knew nothing
about. the process for doing such. When he placed a call
to a friend asking for witnesses and an attorney the
Nlwriff stood by and later introduced portions of his convt>rsation into evidence as attempts to establish an alibi.
( T r. 229) By the time his sister was able to get from
~alt Lake City to Farmington and get in to see defendant
(Tr. 207) three inconsistent statements had been given
Ntrh of which were admitted in to evidence.
The record clearly indicates defendant became distraught over the fact that no one came to help him and
sought counsel from the sheriff ( Tr. 203) who admittedly
had won defendant''S confidence. (Tr. 209) Sheriff Hammon testified, "I'm sure he had f.aith in me, and he
thought I would help him, or he wouldn't have told me."
(Tr. 220) The sheriff then advised the boy it was in his
lwst interst to give a statement if it was an accident. ('T·r.
395)
1

Sheriff Hammon acknowledged the defendant was
frightened and crying when he gave the statement (Tr.
210) and didn't voluntarily narrate the fact situation
(Tr. :?10) and thB~t such had to be elicited on a piece-meal
basis by questions and answers with defendant first denying and then admitting numerous facts and allegations.
(Tr. 406)
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In several places the record indicates that defendant
was in very general terms "advised as to his right to
counsel," (Tr. 192) and "rtold that anything he said could
be used for or against him" (Tr. 199) or that any statements he made "should be given of his free choice." (Tr.
204)
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that
he was told he had an absolute right to remain silent
and to sign nothing in terms which a youth of his age
and emotional development could be expected to understand.
Sheriff Hammon flatly admitted that he did not advise the defendant again of his rights when the final and
most incriminating staJtement was given. ( Tr. 232)
The burden of proof as to volutarinous is upon the
State. State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P. 2d 1097.
Clearly the prosecution failed to meet this burden and
the trial court erred in overruling defense's motion to
suppress such s1tatements.
Since the admissibility of a confession in a state
criminal case is tested by the same standard applied in
federal prosecutions (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
it is necessary to look to the standard set by our Federal
Courts.
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Taken collectively the conditions under which these
WPre obtained violate due process and refute
nny allegation that such were "·an essentially free and

~tat~·mPnts

unconstrained choice" by their maker. Culombe v. Con-

necticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
lT.~. -H) (1962); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 19•1 (1957);
F.S. t'. R·undle, 221 F. Supp 1003, (1963).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY GIVING OVER DEF.ENSE COUNSEL'S OBJE1CTION THE
JURY AN INS'TRUCT'ION ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER
WHEN THE PROSECUTION HAD PROCEEDED UNDER
THE FELONY MURDER THEORY AND THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT A CHARGE OF
SECOND DEGREE MURDER.

Utah •Code Annotated (1953) 76-30-3 provides "Every
murder ... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to prepetrate, any arson, rape, burglary or robbery ...
i~ murder in the first degree."

Utah Code Annotated (1953) 76-9-3 provides "Every
person who ... enters any automobile ... with intent to
~tt,al or to conunit any felony whatever therein is guilty
of burglary . . . "
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The prosecution's case for a first degree InuJruer
charge was based upon a statement given to officers by
defendant declaring he entered the automobile looking for
dope and while he was .looking in the glove compartment,
he pointed the gun at the driver and the gun discharged.
All evidence is circumstantial and the deceased's
companions testified they were asleep and did not know
when the weapon was fired or when the act occurred. The
firearm used was never located or placed into evidence.
When first observed defendant was inside the vehicle
with a pistol in his hand.
StaJteinents introduced by former cellmates together
with circumstantial evidence leading up to and subsequent to the incident are in no way in conflict with the
statement given to the sheriff and there is no evidence to
support an instruction on murder in the second degree.
The prosecution established the criminal agency element of the corpus delecti by using the felony murder
theory and was thus able to introduce the statement
of defendant. (Tr. 164-167) Upon introducing such evidence the state is hound by it.
Under the evidence the defendant was guilty of first
degree murder or not guilty at all. Trial Court's giving of
the instruction on second degree murder ( Tr. 597, 598)
over defense counsel's timely objection ('Tr. 720) was
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elearly prejudicial and reversible error. See Ellis v.
People, 164 P.2d 733 (1945, Colorado) ; Dickens v.
Peoplr, (i7 Colo. 409, 186 P. 277 (1919); Green v. United
States, :?18 F. 2d 856 (1955); see also State v. Thorne, 39
U. ~OS, 117 P. 58 (1912); State v. Mewhinney, 43 U. 135,
1:1-t P. 632 (1913); State v. Condit, 101 U. 558, 125 P. 2d

sot

(19+2).

CONCLUSION
·The appellant respectfully submits that for the
reasons above enumerated the case be reversed and
remanded.
RespectfUllly submitted,
JIMI MlTSUNAGA
Legal Defender
231 ast 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

